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Patterns
of growth
Since the early 1970s manufacturing’s share in all OECD 
economies has fallen and the service sectors’ has risen.
Stephen Nickell, Stephen Redding and Joanna Swaffield
examine the large differences in the pattern and timing of this
process from country to country.
A
key feature of economic growth in indus-
trialised countries since the early 1970s
has been the decline in manufacturing’s
share of GDP and the rise in the share of
the services sector. Although these
changes are common to all OECD
countries, their magnitude and timing
varies substantially. While the United Kingdom and United
States were quick to de-industrialise, Germany and Japan
have retained larger shares of manufacturing in GDP.
A variety of explanations have been proposed for this
change and there has been much popular debate about its
causes and implications. However, there have been few
systematic econometric analyses of the phenomenon and
what work there has been has typically focused on
manufacturing to the exclusion of other sectors.
We have looked at five broad industrial sectors (including
agriculture, manufacturing and the service industries) for 14
OECD countries since the mid-1970s in order to analyse
the reasons for differing patterns of specialisation. Two
popular explanations for de-industrialisation have been
differential rates of technological progress and changes in
relative prices. Our approach incorporates both of these
considerations, while also allowing a role for factor endow-
ments in explaining variation in the magnitude and timing of
structural change and allowing a role for labour market insti-
tutions in shaping the speed of such change.
Levels of educational attainment are one popular explana-
tion for differences in industrial structures. For example,
Germany is frequently characterised as having high levels
of the intermediate or vocational qualifications that lead to
employment in the manufacturing sector. We investigate
this hypothesis using a new dataset on educational attain-
ment constructed from individual-level information in labour
force surveys.
The data allow us to use a definition of educational attain-
ment that is as consistent as possible for different countries
and we have explicitly controlled for any remaining cross-
country variation in the classification of educational levels.
Information is available on an annual basis, providing a
considerable advance on previous work, which relied on
data available only every five years. The period since the
mid-1970s is characterised by increasing levels of educa-
tional attainment in all OECD countries, although the magni-
tude and timing of these changes again varies substantially
from country to country.
A second feature of this period is the marked change in
female labour participation and education decisions.
Between 1975 and 1994, for example, the percentage of
the Canadian female population with a college degree or
equivalent rose from 4.9% (approximately 50% of the male
level) to 11.8% (over 75% of the male level). It is plausible
that male/female differences in labour market outcomes and
their change over time are driven by largely exogenous
cultural attitudes. Indeed, the extent of change varies
markedly across countries with different cultural attitudes.
Thus, while the percentage of the female population with a
college degree or equivalent in Japan rose rapidly between
1975 and 1994, it was still only about 30% of the male
level.
There is a wide literature on the male/female variation in
education decisions and labour market outcomes. For
example, many people have found a substantial gender
wage differential, even after controlling for observable
characteristics (such as age, experience, and occupation)
and for unobserved heterogeneity. There is also informal
evidence of substantial differences by industry and occupa-
tion. For example, men constituted 71% of manufacturing
employment in the UK in 1975, compared with 42% in
business services and 50% in “other” services. Further
variation is observed in levels of educational attainment.
Thus, in 1995, the percentage of female employees with a
college degree or equivalent in UK manufacturing was
approximately 7%, compared with 19% for men.
There has, however, been little attempt so far to systemati-
cally examine the implications of the changes in female/male
education decisions for the production structures of differ-
ent economies. Have economies that have been particularly
successful in increasing levels of female educational attain-
ment, tended to specialise in a different set of industries
from those that have not? 
Our preferred measure of education endowments is the
number of men/women out of the working age male/female
population with a particular level of educational attainment.
This variable rises over time as education levels rise. The
data allows us to test whether the effect on production
structures of particular education levels is the same for men
and women.
There is also a large theoretical and empirical literature on
the role of institutions and public policies in shaping labour
market outcomes. This emphasises the impact of employ-
ment protection and job security provisions in determining
the speed at which workers are reallocated from old and
declining sectors to new and expanding ones. In particular,
previous research has found evidence of a negative effect
of employment protection on growth and aggregate produc-
tivity and employment levels.
We examined the role of employment protection legislation
in determining speeds of adjustment to long-run changes
in patterns of specialisation. Our sample includes
countries with very different extents of employment
protection. We tested econometrically whether or not
employment protection affects the speed of adjustment
towards long-run equilibrium.
Our main source of data in is the OECD’s International
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Sectoral Data Base (ISDB), which provides information for
aggregated manufacturing and non-manufacturing indus-
tries on current price value-added, constant price value-
added, employment, hours worked and the stock of
physical capital. Data on a country’s GDP and aggregate
endowment of physical capital are also obtained from the
ISDB. Information on educational endowments comes from
individual countries’ labour force surveys, while data on
arable land area are taken from the United Nations Food
and Agricultural Organisation (FAO).
Our sample is an unbalanced panel of 14 OECD countries
and of aggregated (one digit) industries during the period
1975 to 1994. Table 1 lists the five one-digit industries
used, together with a sixth category of “Government and
Other Producers”. This last is somewhat of a residual
category and is less likely to be characterised by profit-
maximising behaviour.  For these reasons, it is excluded in
the econometric analysis.  More detailed information on the
disaggregated sectors included in each one-digit industry
is given in Appendix B of the discussion paper on which
this article is based. Table 2 shows the evolution of indus-
try shares of GDP in each of the 14 countries over the
period we are studying.
We see a decline in the share of agriculture in GDP in all
countries, although the rate of decline varies substantially –
from over 95% in Germany from 1975 to 1993 to less than
30% in the Netherlands between 1975 and 1994.
Countries also differ substantially in terms of the share of
manufacturing industry in GDP. In Germany and Japan,
manufacturing constituted about 30% of GDP in 1975,
while in Australia, Canada and Denmark it was responsible
for only 20%.
All countries experienced a decline in manufacturing’s
share of GDP.  However, the magnitude and timing of this
decline varies across countries.  In Australia and the United
Kingdom, manufacturing’s share of GDP declined by
approximately 35% over the sample period, while in
Denmark and Finland it fell by less than 10%. In The
Netherlands and Norway, the decline was most rapid in the
first half of the period, whereas in Germany and Japan most
of the fall in manufacturing’s share of GDP occurred in the
second half.  In other countries, such as Italy and the United
Kingdom, the rate of decline of manufacturing’s share of
GDP was roughly constant over time.
The initial level of the share of “other production” in GDP
varies from about 10% in Germany and the United States
to over 15% in the natural resource rich countries of
Australia and Canada. In all countries except Norway and
Japan the share of this sector in GDP declined between
1975 and 1994. The share of “business services” in GDP
rose in all countries for which data are available. The
increase was most rapid in Australia, The Netherlands,
Sweden and the United Kingdom. It was least rapid in
Denmark and Norway. The share of “other services” in GDP
rose in all countries except Denmark and Norway.
Table 3 shows male and female educational attainment as
a percentage of the male and female population respec-
tively for the years 1975, 1985 and 1994. Data for 1975
are only available for half of the 14 countries and, there-
fore, the discussion here concentrates on the period from
1985 to 1994.  All countries in the table experienced an
increase in the share of the population with higher educa-
tion (college degree or equivalent). The rate of increase in
this period varies markedly: from 38% in Italy and 36% in
The Netherlands to 14% in Denmark and 15% in the
United States. 
All countries showed an increase in the proportion of both
men and women with higher education. The increase is
typically largest for women, which is reflected in a rise
(except in France) in the share of women in the total number
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Table 1: Industry Composition (International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC)) 
Industry Industry Code Further Details
1. Agriculture 10 Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and 
Fishing (ISIC 10)
2. Manufacturing 30 Manufacturing (ISIC 30)
3. Other Production 40 Mining and Quarrying (ISIC 20) Electricity, Gas,
and Water (ISIC 40) Construction (ISIC 50)
4. Other Services 50 Wholesale and Retail Trade, Restaurants and
Hotels (ISIC 60) Transport, Storage, and
Communication (ISIC 70) Community, Social,
and Personal Services (ISIC 90)
5. Business Services 60 Financial Institutions and Insurance (ISIC 82)
Real Estate and Business Services (ISIC 83)
Excluded industry: 
Government/Other Producers 70 Producers of Government Services 
Other Producers 
Notes: see Appendix B of DP545 for
detailed information on the disaggre-
gated sectors included in each one-
digit industry.
Labour market outcomes and institutions play an important roll
of individuals (men plus women) with higher education.
There are notable differences in patterns of educational
attainment. Educational attainment in Germany and Norway
is disproportionately concentrated, relative to other OECD
countries, in the medium education group. In the United
Kingdom in 1975, over 50% of the male population and
over 60% of the female population were in the low educa-
tion group, compared with less than 30% of the male
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Table 2: Shares of Industrial Sectors in a Country’s GDP (per cent)(a)
Country Year Agric Manuf Other Prod. Business Other Gov./
Services Services Other
Australia 1975 4.96 20.35 15.90 15.14 39.02 4.63
1985 3.94 16.94 16.81 18.68 39.59 4.04
1994 2.76 14.25 12.78 24.51 42.08 3.62
Belgium 1975 2.92 25.91 12.84 3.44 (a) 39.39 15.50
1985 2.32 22.67 10.30 5.76 (a) 44.01 14.94
1994 1.57 19.70 9.75 5.45 (a) 50.09 13.44
Canada 1975 4.91 20.35 15.01 15.28 26.14 18.31
1985 3.10 18.96 15.77 18.22 25.78 18.17
1992 2.38 16.26 12.77 21.29 26.94 20.36
Denmark 1975 5.59 19.99 10.21 14.58 29.19 20.44
1985 5.60 19.57 8.15 16.76 27.83 22.09
1992 3.86 18.53 8.60 17.95 28.36 22.70
Finland 1975 10.54 26.05 14.06 12.69 21.38 15.28
1985 8.06 25.09 10.92 14.37 22.95 18.61
1994 5.47 24.42 8.13 18.82 22.23 20.93
France 1975 5.60 27.22 10.36 15.95 25.55 15.32
1985 4.07 23.07 8.95 19.23 26.92 17.76
1992 2.93 20.80 8.33 22.83 28.11 17.00
West 1975 2.88 35.40 10.10 4.64(a) 26.28 14.32
Germany 1985 1.80 32.62 9.09 5.66(a) 29.33 14.09
1993 1.09 27.16 8.32 6.04(a) 35.67 13.68
Italy 1975 7.14 27.43 13.59 5.11(b) 35.48 11.25
1985 4.55 24.61 11.08 4.79(b) 41.86 13.11
1994 2.94 20.52 11.16 4.99(b) 46.82 13.57
Japan 1975 5.28 29.05 11.74 12.93 16.73(c) 10.05
1985 3.06 28.37 10.98 14.78 20.22(c) 9.74
1994 2.05 23.49 13.25 17.17 22.21(c) 9.64
Netherl. 1975 4.72 22.69 13.38 13.73 31.08 14.40
1985 4.15 18.64 15.50 18.29 31.20 12.22
1994 3.52 18.63 9.64 24.10 33.37 10.74
Norway 1975 5.01 21.81 12.21 14.32 30.99 15.66
1985 3.30 13.69 27.35 15.22 25.45 14.99
1991 3.14 12.14 20.49 18.23 28.74 17.26
Sweden 1975 4.84 28.02 10.25 14.40 21.37 21.12
1985 3.59 23.66 9.81 17.58 21.21 24.15
1994 2.16 21.44 8.56 23.33 21.53 22.98
United 1975 2.58 28.21 11.33 15.71 24.73 17.44
Kingdom 1985 1.90 23.92 15.36 18.80 24.24 15.78
1993 1.88 19.94 9.76 24.54 28.69 15.19
United 1975 3.46 22.28 10.07 18.21 31.68 14.30
States 1985 2.07 19.47 10.78 23.08 31.85 12.75
1993 1.65 17.39 8.08 26.74 33.05 13.0
Notes: “Government and Other
Producers” (ISIC 70) is the
excluded industry in the
econometric analysis that follows.
(a) Figures are for the sub-sector
“Financial Institutions and
Insurance”. (ISIC 82) and the
numbers, therefore, sum to less
than 100%.  (b) Figures are for the
sub-sector “Financial Institutions
and Insurance ” (ISIC 82).  (c)
Figures for “Other Services”
exclude the sub-sector “Wholesale
and Retail Trade, Restaurants and
Hotels” (ISIC 60) and, therefore,
sum to less than 100%.  Source:
OECD International Sectoral
Database (ISDB
population and less than 25% of the female population in
the United States.
The share of the male population with higher education
typically exceeds the share of the female population.
However, this is not always so – in France, Italy, and
Sweden in 1985 the share the female population with
higher education exceeded that of the male population.
There are large changes in the relative educational levels of
men and women over time and the rate of change varies
substantially. In Canada in 1975 and Australia in 1982 the
proportion of women with higher education was just over
half that for men. However, by 1993 in Australia and by
1994 in Canada the share of women with higher education
was over 75% that for men. In contrast, in Japan, the share
of women with higher education in 1994 remained about
30% that for men. 
Multiplying the percentage shares in Table 3 by the male
and female population levels shown in Table 4, we obtain
our preferred measure of countries’ endowments of men
and women with each education level. There is much 
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Table 3: Education attainment as a percentage of the male and female working age populations
Men Women
Country Year Low Med High Low Med High
Australia 1982 .484 .438 .078 .623 .333 .044
1985 .462 .448 .091 .592 .353 .055
1993 .341 .542 .117 .441 .469 .090
Belgium 1975 - - - - - -
1986 .349 .600 .051 .457 .523 .021
1994 .277 .649 .073 .350 .614 .035
Canada 1975 .272 .639 .089 .264 .687 .049
1985 .198 .682 .120 .189 .727 .084
1994 .127 .696 .147 .133 .723 .118
Denmark 1983 .337 .611 .053 .452 .531 .017
1985 .240 .707 .053 .386 .595 .019
1994 .190 .751 .055 .302 .665 .028
Finland 1984 .526 .387 .086 .562 .359 .079
1985 .512 .399 .089 .547 .370 .082
1994 .438 .440 .121 .440 .435 .125
France 1982 .469 .421 .109 .466 .405 .129
1985 .425 .449 .125 .418 .436 .146
1994 .307 .511 .181 .308 .485 .207
West Germany 1984 .148 .783 .109 .315 .647 .051
1985 .143 .774 .121 .311 .644 .057
1994 .132 .758 .140 .252 .681 .083
Italy 1979 .529 .426 .044 .474 .477 .049
1985 .392 .550 .058 .330 .607 .063
1994 .217 .715 .083 .172 .744 .094
Japan 1975 .433 .425 .142 .484 .487 .029
1985 .306 .501 .193 .336 .619 .045
1994 .228 .534 .238 .226 .703 .071
Netherlands 1975 .371 .526 .103 .490 .460 .050
1985 .216 .630 .153 .278 .621 .100
1994 .146 .648 .206 .169 .671 .160
Norway 1976 .023 .862 .114 .018 .915 .067
1985 .030 .822 .147 .025 .869 .106
1994 .029 .775 .195 .028 .803 .169
Sweden 1975 .553 .323 .123 .596 .301 .103
1985 .410 .413 .177 .420 .398 .181
1994 .293 .430 .203 .262 .443 .227
UK 1975 .514 .438 .048 .634 .352 .015
1985 .375 .528 .097 .447 .508 .046
1994 .258 .618 .124 .314 .613 .073
United States 1975 .274 .549 .177 .229 .625 .146
1985 .166 .598 .237 .122 .672 .206
1994 .117 .605 .270 .083 .659 .257
Notes: Educational attainment data
are from individual-level information
in country labour force surveys.
Low = no education or primary
education; Medium = secondary
and/or vocational qualifications;
High = college degree or
equivalent.  
There have been marked changes in female labour participation
variation between countries in their relative levels of educa-
tional endowment and in the extent to which our five
chosen industries employ men and women of a given 
educational level.
In 1975, for example, the ratio of arable land to physical
capital in the United States was approximately 10 times that
in the Netherlands. Countries also display very different
rates of physical capital accumulation, with the physical
capital stock rising between 1975 and 1992 by 113% in
Japan, compared with a rise of 34% in Denmark.
An account of our economic estimation is given in our
Discussion Paper, “Educational Attainment, Labour Market
Institutions and the Structure of Production”. We consid-
ered the static long-run relationships between the share of
a sector in GDP, relative prices, technology and factor
endowments. Economic theory leads us to expect that the
more productive an industry, or the higher the price
received by firms in that industry, the greater the amount of
output that will be produced. With the exception of “Other
Services”, where the measurement of technology and
prices is particularly difficult, we find exactly this pattern of
estimated coeffecients.
Our measures of factor endowments have a statistically
significant effect on patterns of production. The coeffi-
cients on individual endowments vary substantially
between industries. For example, while endowments of
low education men have a positive and statistically signifi-
cant effect on the share of agriculture and other services,
the effect in manufacturing and business services is
negative (with the coefficient for manufacturing significant
at the 12% level). Male and female educational endow-
ments have very different implications for patterns of
production. For example, while endowments of medium
education men have a negative and statistically significant
effect on the share of business services in GDP, the effect
of endowments of medium education women is positive
and statistically significant. These empirical results provide
statistical support for the idea that men and women of the
same educational level have (or are perceived to have)
different vectors of other characteristics or dimension of
skills. They are consistent with the large labour market
literature that finds substantial differences between men
and women in terms of labour market outcomes.
In practice, it is likely to take time for factors of production
to be reallocated from declining to expanding sectors. The
speed at which this happens may depend on labour market
policies and institutions – in particular, on employment
protection provisions that limit the ability of firms in declin-
ing sectors to shed labour or raise the cost to of them 
of doing so. So we added a lagged dependent variable to
our calculations and interacted it with a measure of the
extent of employment protection to capture these dynamics.
The estimated coefficients indicate that the employment
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Table 4: Endowments of physical capital (US $ bn, 
1990 prices); population (’000); arable land 
area (’000 hectares)
Country Year Capital Males Females Arable 
Australia 1979 789.80 4777 4651 43932
1985 971.04 5294 5148 47150
1993 1226.92 5944 5828 46300
Belgium 1975 385.88 - - 982
1986 536.11 3338 3312 765
1994 671.63 3378 3325 777
Canada 1975 1123.04 7649 7531 44000
1985 1686.04 8946 8827 45900
1992 2192.23 9756 9609 45370
Denmark 1983 374.89 1702 1673 2593
1985 389.32 1716 1683 2601
1992 441.74 1768 1721 2539
Finland 1984 353.87 1663 1663 2294
1985 365.18 1672 1667 2276
1994 457.47 1719 1685 2267
France 1982 2419.60 17674 17611 17651
1985 2573.97 18181 18224 17923
1992 3061.88 18797 18839 18046
W Germany 1984 3756.45 21259 21396 11952
1985 3845.38 21355 21385 11957
1993 4716.85 28117 27127 11676
Italy 1977 2380.55 17800 18645 9359
1985 3054.87 19313 19973 9050
1994 3911.39 19353 19607 8329
Japan 1975 2757.52 37180 38460 4460
1985 5276.81 40950 41360 4209
1994 8572.96 43630 43360 3999
Netherlands 1975 583.50 4406 4322 759
1985 732.83 5023 4899 826
1994 886.90 5182 5353 885
Norway 1975 203.16 1266 1239 792
1985 319.33 1355 1314 858
1991 376.38 1403 1355 892
Sweden 1975 414.12 2660 2599 3006
1985 532.66 2729 2665 2922
1994 669.49 2844 2754 2780
United 1975 1970.63 17554 17638 6883
Kingdom 1985 2464.50 18643 18555 7006
1993 3063.79 19019 18763 6081
United 1975 13658.82 68335 70560 186472
States 1985 18257.51 78450 80067 187765
1993 22083.93 83768 84837 181950
Notes: Capital is stock of real physical capital from OECD’s
International Sectoral Database (ISDB).  Male and female population
data from individual country labour force surveys.  Arable land area
from United Nations Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO).
It takes time for factors of production to be reallocated
protection interaction was positively signed and statistically
significant for the three industries that declined as a share
of GDP during our period – agriculture, manufacturing and
“other production”. This provides evidence that countries
with higher levels of employment protection were slower to
reallocate resources away from these sectors in response
to a change in long-run patterns of specialisation. The
employment interaction was positively signed, although not
statistically significant, for the two industries that expanded
as a share of GDP during the period – “other services” and
business services. This is consistent with the idea that the
main effect of employment protection is to raise the cost of
shedding labour in declining sectors.
We found the effects of employment protection to be not
only statistically significant but also quantitatively important.
The estimated coefficient for the lagged dependent variable
in manufacturing ranged from 0.44 for the United States at
one extreme to 0.78 for Italy at the other, a difference of
over 75%).
Looking at the general equilibrium effects of changes
across different industries, we estimated that moving a man
from low to medium education reduces the share of agricul-
ture and “other production” in GDP, but increases the share
of manufacturing and “other services”. In contrast, the
effect of moving a woman from low to medium education is
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Table 5 Contribution of Explanatory Variables to Changes in Shares of GDP percentage points.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Agriculture Manufact. Other Business Other
Production Production Services Services
Services
West Germany (1985-93)
Actual Change in GDP Share 6.34 -0.71 -5.46 -0.78 0.38
Predicted Change in GDP Share 5.25 -0.92 -4.54 -2.26 2.38
Education (Male + Female) 3.25 1.41 -1.10 -1.12 -0.39
Capital 0.14 -0.39 -0.42 0.71 0.61
Arable Land 0.04 -0.17 -0.13 -0.01 0.35
TFP 0.38 1.51 0.31 0.12 -1.01
Prices -1.33 0.00 -1.32 0.68 1.12
Year Effects -1.56 -4.39 0.43 1.27 0.94
Japan (1976-93)
Actual Change in GDP Share 5.43 -3.14 -4.93 1.81 3.43
Predicted Change in GDP Share 4.57 -3.45 -5.47 2.50 3.88
Education (Male + Female) 3.70 1.89 0.38 -3.56 0.95
Capital 0.71 -1.90 -2.07 3.53 3.02
Arable Land 0.15 -0.67 -0.52 -0.03 1.36
TFP -2.01 2.55 -1.54 -1.01 0.62
Prices -1.01 -0.51 6.68 -1.15 -1.46
Year Effects -3.17 -5.33 3.51 1.58 -2.67
United Kingdom (1976-93)
Actual Change in GDP Share 3.97 -0.92 -7.65 -2.14 8.48
Predicted Change in GDP Share 2.22 -1.30 -9.16 0.09 8.88
Education (Male + Female) 3.56 1.98 1.52 -4.43 1.91
Capital 0.29 -0.78 -0.85 1.45 1.24
Arable Land 0.20 -0.92 -0.72 -0.04 1.87
TFP 0.25 -4.70 3.87 -1.73 -1.43
Prices -0.86 1.04 -1.29 5.70 -0.36
Year Effects -3.17 -5.33 3.51 1.58 -2.67
United States (1976-93)
Actual Change in GDP Share 1.22 -1.39 -5.48 -2.07 8.64
Predicted Change in GDP Share 1.98 -1.89 -6.69 -1.27 8.12
Education (Male + Female) 3.08 1.97 0.89 -2.92 0.32
Capital 0.32 -0.85 -0.93 1.58 1.35
Arable Land 0.04 -0.18 -0.14 -0.01 0.36
TFP 0.86 -0.03 -1.37 0.58 -0.98
Prices -1.91 -1.20 0.56 4.06 0.83
Year Effects -3.17 -5.33 3.51 1.58 -2.67
Notes: For an explanation of
the methodology used to
derive this table, see Table 9 in
the CEP's Discussion Paper
No. 545, page 26. 
The decline in manufacturing was earlier and more extensive in
the UK and the US than in German and Japan
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to reduce a country's specialisation in manufacturing, but to
increase it in business services. Similarly, moving a man
from medium to higher education increases specialisation in
business services, though moving a woman from medium to
higher education has the opposite effect. Thus, production
structure responds very differently to the educational attain-
ment of men and women.
Table 5 evaluates the contribution of each of the explanatory
variables to observed changes in shares of GDP during our
period. For simplicity, we focus on our static specification,
excluding the lagged dependent variable and its interaction.
In general, the predicted changes in GDP shares for each
of the five industries lie close to the actual changes, provid-
ing evidence that our model is relatively successful in
explaining changes in specialisation over time.  The model
is least successful for “other production”. This is consistent
with the existence of unobserved changes in known mineral
resources, which are important for this sector.  The year
effects play a substantial role in all sectors except business
services, supporting the idea that de-industrialisation is part
of a secular trend and a shared experience across OECD
countries.
The table indicates clearly how the timing and magnitude of
de-industrialisation varies substantially from country to
country. The decline in manufacturing’s share of GDP
occurred earlier and was more extensive in the United
Kingdom and United States than in Germany and Japan.  It
suggests that this is largely explained by differences in rates
of Total Factor Productivity (TFP) growth in the four
countries. The effect of TFP growth on changes in
manufacturing’s share of GDP was negative in the United
Kingdom (-4.7 points) and the United States (-0.03 points),
but positive in West Germany (1.51 points) and Japan (1.51
points). In Japan, the rapid decline in agriculture’s share of
GDP (3.14 points) is largely explained by rates of TFP
growth (an effect -2.01 points), although the evolution of
relative prices across sectors also had an important influ-
ence (-1.01 points).
Overall, as the table shows, rising educational attainment
made a large negative contribution to the change in the
GDP share of “other production” and a large positive
contribution to the change in “Other Services”. This is
consistent with the idea that many service sectors are
relatively skill intensive. The table suggests that the more
rapid increase in business services’ GDP share in the
United Kingdom and United States, relative to West
Germany and Japan, was largely due to country-specific
changes in relative prices (which, for example, made a
contribution of 5.7 points in the United Kingdom and -1.15
points in Japan).  Physical capital also made a positive
contribution to the expansion of business services and
“Other Services”, which is consistent with the high values
of the real estate involved in these sectors.
Stephen Nickell is a member of the Bank of England’s Monetary
Policy Committee and a member of the CEP.
Stephen Redding is a lecturer in the Economics Department of
the LSE and a member of the CEP.
Joanna Swaffield is a lecturer in the Economics Department of
the University of York and a member of the CEP.
This article is based on their paper ÒEducational Attainment,
Labour Market Institutions and the Structure of ProductionÓ,
available from the CEP (Discussion Paper 545).
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t the beginning this year, the European Union
approved a major piece of industrial relations
law – the Directive on Information and
Consultation (2002/14/EC). Its provisions
are due to cover all enterprises with 150 or
more employees by early 2005 and all with
50 or more employees by 2008.  This summer the govern-
ment produced a green paper in response entitled “High
Performance Workplaces: The Role of Employee
Involvement in a Modern Economy: A Discussion Paper”.
This means that, in less than five years’ time, three quarters
of the entire UK labour force will be affected by the direc-
tive. It will certainly start immediately to have an impact, as
managements and unions plan for its implementation.  The
question is whether this opportunity will be used to estab-
lish an effective system of information sharing and joint
consultation in British industry or whether it will become
another of the long list of historically missed opportunities in
this area.
The box opposite gives a summary of some of the main
provisions of the directive. It is clear that these are far-
reaching, so far as British industrial relations are
concerned.  Exactly how the directive will be incorporated
into UK law will depend on political circumstances.
However, some outcomes are reasonably certain. Forms of
consultation based on direct participation will not qualify.
Equally, ad hoc and issue-specific arrangements will not
qualify, since the directive talks about a “permanent” and
“general” system of consultation (Article 10). Many other
existing systems of consultation will also not qualify, such as
those where representatives are appointed by manage-
ment. Trade union collective bargaining will qualify, provided
that non-members are not disenfranchised. In addition, it
seems likely that arrangements will have to be created at
multiple levels within enterprises.
Other elements are still unclear. For example, how, in the
absence of an employer initiative, will a request for a council
or committee be instigated?  Will there be a process of
balloting?  Who will be deemed to be representatives and
how will such persons emerge? What exact sanctions will
there be? However, as with all EU-derived law, the domes-
Consulting the
workers
The government’s green paper on employee involvement in the
modern economy asks for evidence and comments by 11 December.
Howard Gospel and Paul Willman offer their commentary on its
implications in the context of the EU’s new directive on employee
information and consultation.
by Howard Gospel and Paul Willman
tic version will be subject to interpreta-
tion by the European Court of Justice.
In the past, in areas such as represen-
tation, sex discrimination, and working
time, the Court has rendered
Directives far-reaching.
British trade unions and employers
come to the directive with traditional
attitudes and historical experiences
that differ from those of their continen-
tal counterparts. Historically, British
employers made most decisions on
work matters unilaterally. 
During the First World War, both
collective bargaining and joint consul-
tation developed significantly at
national and workplace levels. In 1918
the Whitley Committee recommended
that both should be further elaborated,
with collective bargaining concentrated
on pay and conditions and joint consul-
tation on other matters, especially at
the workplace. At the time, however,
strong unions showed little interest.
Weaker unions accepted the propos-
als on multi-employer bargaining, but
again showed little interest in joint
consultation. Equally, most employers
were reluctant to accept workplace
level representation, either by shop
stewards or other worker representa-
tives. At that time it was Germany that
introduced by law a system of
combined collective bargaining and
joint consultation. 
In the thirty years after 1945, as they
saw their membership and power
grow, British unions demanded collec-
tive bargaining in preference to joint
consultation. This contrasted with the
situation in continental Europe, where
employee consultation was firmly
established by statute in Germany,
France, and other countries, and
operated alongside collective negotia-
tions. This difference was reflected in
the 1968 report of the Donovan Royal
Commission:  “Collective bargaining is
the most effective means of giving
workers the right to representation in
decisions affecting their working lives”. Approvingly, it
quoted Bill McCarthy’s research paper for the Royal
Commission as saying that consultative committees
“cannot survive the development of effective shop floor
organisation: either they must change their character and
become essentially negotiating commit-
tees… or they will be boycotted by
shop stewards and fall into disuse”. 
Some interim conclusions may be
drawn from this brief historical survey.
First, the paradox of “free” collective
bargaining in Britain was that it relied
heavily on a framework of legal immuni-
ties and state support. It provided
neither much of a ceiling on union
aspirations in good times, nor much of a
floor in bad times. Second, collective
bargaining and joint consultation grew
up in an interrelated and complex
relationship. At times, they comple-
mented each other; at other times, the
one subsumed the other. Third, unions
and employers missed a number of
opportunities to build a system of
employee representation based on
interlocking collective bargaining and
joint consultation. In the case of the
unions, they missed the opportunity to
secure positive legal rights when they
were strong. From the late 1970s
onwards, the coverage of collective
bargaining shrank quickly. 
From the 1970s, a number of factors
shaped the practice of representation in
Britain. First, legal intervention steadily
increased. Some of this was initially
auxiliary to collective bargaining, such
as the provisions in the early 1970s for
union recognition and for information
disclosure. Some of it mandated forms
of representation on specific issues,
such as health and safety and, as a
result of EU membership, collective
redundancies and transfer of undertak-
ings. These procedures initially gave
legal priority to union representatives,
but, in their absence, allowed for non-
union representation. Second, the
favourable political and legal context
changed with the election of the
Thatcher government in 1979. Through
the subsequent years, immunities were
removed and restrictions were placed
on unions and their collective bargaining
activities. Third, union membership and
the coverage of collective bargaining
began to shrink, undoubtedly in part as
a result of an increasingly hostile legal
and political environment. Fourth, from
the 1980s onwards, employers increas-
ingly looked to alternative voice mecha-
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Main principles in 
the Directive
1. Consultation is defined as “an exchange
of views and the establishment of
dialogue” (Article 2), which implies an
ongoing process.
2. Article 4 outlines the minimum obligations
created: (a) an obligation to provide infor-
mation on the general business situation
of the undertaking; (b) an obligation to
inform and consult on the likely develop-
ment of employment and on “anticipatory
measures” that might threaten employ-
ment; and (c) an enhanced obligation to
inform and consult on decisions likely to
lead to substantial changes in work
organisation or in contractual relations.
Consultation must take place at an
“appropriate” time, with employee repre-
sentatives able to study the information
adequately in advance and to prepare for
it properly. It must also be “at the relevant
level of management and representation
depending on the subject under discus-
sion”, which implies that there should be
different levels of representation and
consultation within an undertaking.
Consultation under (c) above shall be
“with a view to reaching an agreement”,
which implies an ongoing process of give-
and-take. Management is obliged in all
consultation to provide a reasoned
response to representatives’ opinions.
3. Employers and employee representatives
may negotiate different arrangements
before and after the directive comes into
force, but these would have to respect its
principles (Article 5).
4. Representatives must have adequate
“‘protection and guarantees” to enable
them to perform their duties (Article 7). 
5. Employers may withhold information that
they consider would seriously damage
their undertaking, while representatives
and “any experts who assist them” 
may be made subject to an obligation of
confidentiality. 
6. Sanctions for failure to comply shall be
“effective, proportionate, and dissuasive”
(Article 8).
nisms, based in part on indirect representation via joint
consultation, but based more on direct communication and
participation via direct workforce meetings, briefing groups,
and problem-solving circles. 
The election of a Labour government in 1997 led to new
legislation on union recognition. It also led to the reformu-
lation of law deriving from European directives on repre-
sentation in collective redundancies and transfer of
undertakings, where priority in the choice of representa-
tives is now vested in a descending order of, first, union
stewards, then representatives of standing consultative
committees, and, last, representatives chosen ad hoc for
the specific purpose. In the case of multinational corpora-
tions, the government also implemented the European
Works Councils Directive. This created two precedents: it
established legally-based, standing, general consultative
arrangements in Britain, albeit for a particular group of
employees; and it introduced the idea of representation
that is inclusive rather than exclusive, giving priority in the
choice of representatives to the entire workforce and not
just to union members.  When this is combined with the
acceptance of the EU directive on information and consul-
tation rights in national level undertakings, it is clear that,
in terms of the law and practice, Britain has moved
decisively down a multi-channel road, but has still been
left with a fragmented system of information, consultation
and representation.
So let us look at the state of employee representation in
Britain today and how it has changed over the past two
decades. We use here successive Workplace Industrial
Relations Surveys (WIRS) for 1980, 1984 and 1990, the
Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS) for
1998, and the CEP’s British Workplace Representation and
Participation Survey (BWRPS) for 2001.
In 1998 unions were recognised in 42% of all workplaces
with 25 or more employees and had a presence (i.e.
membership but no recognition) in another 12%. In other
words, almost half of all such workplaces had no union
presence at all. In the private sector, unions were recog-
nised in only 25% of these workplaces. However, recogni-
tion is not representation. In 1998, 28% of these
workplaces had union representatives, 7% had non-union
representatives, and 4% had both. On the whole, non-
union representatives were slightly more likely to be found
in workplaces where there was a union presence, but no
union recognition.  Overall it should be kept in mind that a
majority of workplaces had no representatives of any kind.
In 1998, the coverage of joint consultative committees was
not very different from that of collective bargaining, with
29% of all workplaces having a workplace consultative
committee.  In the private sector, this was true of 20% of all
workplaces. (Some of these consultative committees,
however, were not always “functioning” i.e. meeting at least
three times a year.) Equally, there was evidence of a similar
“hollowing out” of collective bargaining institutions.
Consultative committees can exist at various levels. Thus, in
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Table 1. % scope of negotiation, information, and information-provision, by type of worker representatives, 1998
Issue Negotiates % Consults % Informs % None%
Union representatives
Pay or conditions of employment 38 13 17 32
Recruitment or selection 3 15 30 52
Training 5 29 24 42
Systems of payment 12 16 26 46
Handling grievances 18 54 13 15
Staffing or manpower planning 6 33 24 37
Equal opportunities 7 41 17 35
Health and safety 13 62 11 14
Performance appraisals 6 25 16 53
Non-union representatives – workplaces with no recognition
Pay or conditions of employment 16 33 36 15
Recruitment or selection 2 33 32 33
Training 3 46 24 27
Systems of payment 4 20 48 28
Handling grievances 14 50 16 20
Staffing or manpower planning 3 36 40 21
Equal opportunities 10 45 23 22
Health and safety 18 62 19 1
Performance appraisals 2 48 19 31
Note. All establishments
with 25 or more
employees. The figures
for union representatives
are weighted and based
on responses from 923
managers in workplaces
with 25 or more
employees, union
recognition and a union
representative on site.
The figures for non-union
representatives are
weighted and based on
responses from 134
managers in workplaces
with 25 or more
employees and without
union recognition, but
with non-union
representative.
Source. WERS 98. 
the private sector, 16% of workplaces had a committee at
workplace level and 18% at a higher level, but only 8% had
both. Size effects here are complicated. Workplace size is
positively associated with the existence of a workplace
committee, but negatively associated with the use only of a
higher-level committee. Organisational size is negatively
associated with workplace committees, but positively
associated with higher-level committees or a combination of
the two. Union recognition and consultative committees
appear to be associated. Thus, overall, 74% of workplaces
with a recognised union had a committee, compared with
34% those without one. 
Overall, the scope of joint regulation is modest. Table 1
shows the balance of negotiation, consultation, and infor-
mation sharing by issue in the minority of workplaces where
there is on-site representation. In workplaces where there
are union representatives, bargaining is clearly dominated
by pay and, to a lesser extent, by grievance handling. In
these workplaces, aside from “pay bargaining” and “griev-
ance handling”, consultation and information sharing is the
dominant joint process. In workplaces where there are non-
union representatives and no union recognition, information
and consultation are the dominant processes, but a surpris-
ing amount of negotiation is reported on “health and safety”
and on “pay and conditions”. Again, unilateral management
regulation is a large category, but less so than in
workplaces where there are union representatives. 
A final point here is that, in the private sector at least, the
main form of workplace communication and participation is
of the direct kind. Thus, 35% of workplaces have problem-
solving groups, 35% regular workplace meetings and 43%
briefing groups. Taking these three practices together, 75%
of all workplaces and 72% of private sector workplaces
had one or more of them.
The main changes over the past two decades are encapsu-
lated in Table 2. First, there is a major decline in union
density and presence, in particular in the private sector,
where both density and recognition halved in 18 years. The
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Table 2. Union presence, density, and recognition, collective bargaining, and joint consultative 
arrangements, 1980 to 1998
1980 % 1984 % 1990 % 1998 %
Union presence – by workplace
All 73 73 64 54
Private manufacturing 77 67 58 42
Private services 50 53 46 35
Union density – percentage of employees
All 65 58 47 36
Private 56 43 36 26
Union recognition – by workplace
All 64 66 53 42
Private 50 48 38 25
Collective bargaining predominant form of pay determination – by workplace
All 60 42 29
Private manufacturing 50 33 23
Private services 36 29 14
Consultation – incidence of joint consultative committee – by workplace
All – any consultative committee 34 34 29 29
All – any functioning consultative committee 30 31 26 23
Private 26 24 18 20
Union recognition 37 36 34 30
No recognition 17 20 17 18
Source. Adapted from
Millward et al. (2000),
pp. 85-87, 96, 109,
186-191, 197
Will this become
another in the
long list of
historically
missed
opportunities?
proportion of workplaces where collective bargaining was
the dominant form of pay determination fell overall from 60
to 29% between 1984 and 1998.  In private sector
manufacturing, it fell from 50 to 23% and in private sector
services from 36 to 14%.
Second, the pattern of change in consultation is different.
Overall, the decline is less marked than for the union-related
variables. The overall and private sector trends on consul-
tation coverage are not as divergent as those on union
variables. In fact, there is a slight rise in private sector
consultation coverage between 1990 and 1998. Third, the
percentage of workplaces with union representatives fell
from 53% to 33% between 1980 and 1998, whereas those
with a non-union representative (where no union represen-
tative) increased from 16% to 41%.
Third, one of the main developments over the last 20 years
has been the growth of “direct voice” arrangements. Thus,
regular meetings between senior managers and the
workforce, problem-solving groups, and briefing groups
increased significantly in the private sector. Between 1984
and 1998, the proportion of workplaces where there was
union-only voice fell from 24% to 9%; the proportion
where there was both indirect voice (union and non-union)
and direct voice fell from 45% to 39%; but those where
managers relied solely on direct arrangements rose from
11% to 30%. In the case of briefing groups, the increase
was confined to workplaces without a union and those
without a consultative committee. Regular meetings and
problem-solving groups were more common where there
was union representation and where there was joint
consultation.   Overall, direct communication practices do
not seem to have been used to supplant indirect represen-
tation via trade unions, but there is some weak evidence
that they may be used to exclude unions.
Faced with the opportunities offered by the new directive,
what is it that British workers want?  There are substantial
difficulties involved in answering this question. Not least is
the fact that, with surveys, workers may say they want one
thing in everyday circumstances, but may want something
very different in other circumstances, as when confronted
with a major change in contractual arrangements or 
collective redundancies. However, the BWRPS survey
indicates some answers. Its main findings here are
summarised in Table 3. 
A majority of British workers report reasonably high levels
of satisfaction in their jobs and of commitment to their
employing organisation. However, they are often critical of
management and a majority desire more say in decisions
about work tasks, pay levels and organisational gover-
nance. A high 38% identify current problems with unfair
and arbitrary treatment, in areas such as rewards and disci-
pline and report favouritism and bullying. Despite this, 50%
per cent of workers reported that they did not go to anyone
for help with work difficulties. There would, therefore, seem
to be a fairly high flow of problems in British workplaces,
which is borne out by the rapid increase in recent years in
enquiries to the Advisory Conciliation and Arbitration
Service and to Citizens Advice Bureaus and cases to
Industrial Tribunals.
Table 3 also suggests that most workers would prefer to
deal with problems collectively, rather than individually. The
only area where there is a clear preference for individual
remedies is promotion. However, it should be noted that in
most cases the preference is for dealing with issues via a
group of fellow workers, rather than via a trade union or
staff association representative. Perhaps not surprisingly,
union members show a stronger preference for collective
solutions and prefer union representation, rather than
working through a group of fellow workers. The exceptions
are again on matters of promotion and training, where union
members would look more to a group of fellow workers.
Non-union employees prefer fellow workers to unions as
the preferred method of collective action on all issues. It is
notable that workers in situations where there is a recog-
nised union (and where there is both a union presence and
a consultative committee) would seem to have the highest
preference for collective solutions.
Table 4 explores this further and shows that a large major-
ity (72%) of employees think their workplaces would be
better with some form of collective representation. This
breaks down as 92% of union members and 61% of non-
union members. However, in the case of union members, it
is striking that only 11% favour a union on its own, whereas
74% favour both a union and a joint consultative committee
or works council. The wishes of non-union members are
more dispersed: 34% cent want no form of representation;
29% favour a joint consultative committee on its own; 27%
favour a joint consultative committee and a trade union; but
only 5% favour a union on its own. Workers who are in
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British
employers
made most
decisions on
work matters
unilaterally
Table 3 % preferences of employees for dealing with workplace issues 
Sexual or racial discrimination at work
Group of fellow workers 72 78 68 78 78 70 76 63
Union or staff association rep. 67 84 58 72 77 56 83 54
Negotiating salary
Group of fellow workers 65 81 56 73 74 60 82 44
Union or staff association rep. 53 80 38 73 77 38 72 31
Negotiating hours and conditions
Group of fellow workers 71 81 65 73 75 67 80 62
Union or staff association rep. 52 76 38 69 73 39 68 34
Promotion issues
Group of fellow workers 46 50 43 39 37 54 50 38
Union or staff association rep. 27 36 23 34 35 21 33 20
Workplace bullying
Group of fellow workers 69 72 68 70 71 74 74 60
Union or staff association rep. 58 80 46 65 69 46 75 41
Training and skill development
Group of fellow workers 67 73 65 66 63 73 71 59
Union or staff association rep. 30 36 26 40 41 28 30 23
All 
employees
Only
workplace
with union
presence 
Only
Workplaces
with 
recognised
unions
Only
workplaces
with WC 
or JCC
Both
WC/JCC
and union
presence at
workplace
Neither 
WC/JCC
or union
presence at
workplace
Would you prefer to deal with this
problem on your own or with… 
Member Non-member
Union membership
status 
Note: Sample was divided at random into two variants. One variant asked if the respondent preferred
to solve specific problems on their own or with the help of a group of colleagues or fellow workers.
The other variant asked if respondents preferred to solve problems on their own or with the help of a
trade union or staff association representative. Each respondent could only choose either an individual
or collective solution. 
Source: BWRPS (2001) Q35
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Table 4 Do you think your workplace would be better with…?  
%
Do you think your workplace 
would be better with…
Trade Union on its own 7 11 5 14 16 2 9 6
Works Council on its own 21 6 29 11 10 40 9 27
Works Council and Trade Union 44 74 27 60 63 24 72 20
Neither 24 5 34 11 8 31 9 43
Don't Know 4 3 5 3 3 3 2 4
Source: BWRPS (2001), Q51. 
All 
employees
%
Only
workplace
with union
presence
%
Only
Workplaces
with recog-
nised
unions
%
Only
workplaces
with WC 
or JCC
%
Both
WC/JCC
and union
presence at
workplace
%
Neither 
WC / JCC
or union
presence at
workplace
%
Member  Non-member
Union membership
status 
situations where there is already a union and a consultative
committee are the most in favour of dual representation
(72%), but it is also striking that workers in situations where
there is a recognised union or a union presence are also
well disposed to dual representation. There is little prefer-
ence for a consultative committee on its own, except where
there is already the situation. All this suggests both union
and non-union members see these unions and consultative
committees as complementary. 
Taking this further, the BWRPS survey shows that 82% of
workers would be in favour of legislation that required
management to meet with employee representatives.
Overall, union members are more favourably inclined to
statutory works councils than non-members (89% as
opposed to 77%). However, support for legislation is
strongest (92%) where there are already dual channels. In
addition, there is a strong feeling that works councils should
be elected by workers (72%), have legal protections from
possible discrimination by employers (75%), and meet on a
regular basis and not just at management discretion (89%).
On the other hand, the proportion favouring confidential
information for employee representatives is relatively low
(40% in the case of union members and 33% cent in the
case of non-members). 
Experience on the Continent has been very different.
Germany went down the road of multi-channel representa-
tion – collective bargaining outside the firm, alongside
legally based joint consultation at the workplace and
company levels, and representation on the supervisory
boards of companies. German unions have benefited from
their relationship with works councils and vice versa.
Works councillors tend to be union members; the union
provides advice to the council, and this in turn gives the
union salience. Employees through their works councils
receive more information and experience more consultation
than their British counterparts. However, in recent years,
some works councils have come to supersede unions, in
terms of the issues being discussed through the consulta-
tion process and of agreed deviations from nationally
bargained agreements. 
In union terms, the German story is usually seen as a
positive one. Union membership has only fallen from 35 to
29% of the workforce over the last 20 years. The coverage
and scope of collective bargaining and joint consultation
remain high, though with some shift towards decentralised
dealings via works councils.
By contrast, the French story might be seen as a more
negative one. Historically, France also went down the road
of multi-channel representation, with legally based joint
consultation alongside collective bargaining. Periodically,
French governments have intervened in industrial relations
to support consultative arrangements. Since 1945, the law
has mandated the election of a comit dÕenterprise.
Buttressed by further legislation in the early 1980s, the
purpose of the comits dÕenterprise is to ensure expression
of the views of employees and to allow their interests to be
taken into account in decisions. French employers are
legally obliged to inform and consult employees over a wide
range of matters. 
However, in France, for a number of reasons, this has not
worked as well as in Germany. In part, this has been
because French comits dÕenterprise have less extensive
rights and are more employer-led than German works
councils. In larger part, it is because French unions are
more fragmented, have less presence at the workplace
and, consequently, have been less able to use the law and
institutions. In France, union membership has fallen from 18
to 9% of the workforce over the last 20 years and the scope
of collective bargaining at workplace level has narrowed.
There is evidence that joint consultation and collective
bargaining have not complemented one another and the
former has often come to substitute for the latter. On the
other hand, French workers would undoubtedly obtain less
in the absence of the comit dÕenterprise and, arguably,
French unions have been able to maintain a foothold in
many companies largely because of the role they play in
these arrangements.
What, then, are British workers likely to get out 
of the process being set in train by the new impetus that
the new directive will give to indirect representation via
joint consultation?
Employers have the advantage that they have come to
control employee relations and that, in many cases, they
have introduced more sophisticated human resource
policies than in the past. On the other hand, they are faced
with constraints, quite apart from the new directive.
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Employees seem to want a more representative voice at
work and employers now confront unions that are more
confident than they have been for many years. Undoubtedly,
some employers will seek to avoid new arrangements,
arguing either that they already have adequate mechanisms
or that their employees do not want arrangements on these
lines. This strategy clearly has dangers in that it may be
challenged in all or in parts of an enterprise. For other
employers, there is an opportunity to establish arrange-
ments, either wholly or partially new, either with or without
trade unions. 
Unions must fear that employers may use the directive to
exclude or eject them and that they may have neither the
leverage nor the capability to mobilise workers to achieve
and operate new information and consultation arrange-
ments. On the other hand, there is evidence that employ-
ees desire more voice at work; that many workplaces have
a union presence, which can be built on; and that unions
now have legal supports, which they can potentially turn to
their advantage. At one end of the spectrum, where unions
already have a high level of membership and bargaining
coverage, they may eschew new arrangements, but use
the law to capitalise on what they already have and expand
the scope and level of consultation and bargaining. 
At the other end of the spectrum, where unions have no
presence, they will have little choice but to accept what
employers may put into place. Here unions will have mixed
motivations as to whether they wish to see such arrange-
ments succeed. Where arrangements are successful, this
may mean permanent union exclusion; where they are less
successful, this may mean new opportunities to intervene.
It is in situations at the middle of the spectrum, where there
is hollow recognition or a partial presence at some levels
or in some parts of an undertaking, that unions will confront
challenges and have real opportunities to increase their
membership and activities.
The main form 
of workplace
communication
and participation
is of the 
direct kind
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D
uring my first
several years on
the Federal
Reserve Board of
Governors, the US
economy seemed
to be breaking all
the old rules. In
particular, equity valuations seemed to
be ignoring previously well-
established norms about fair valuation;
and inflation remained low, or even
declined, as the unemployment rate
fell to levels that in the past had been
associated with rising inflation. This
last year has seen a dramatic
downward correction in those equity
valuations.
Large swings in equity prices provide
challenges to monetary policy. They
can increase the threat of the
economy over-heating on the way up
and they can increase the
vulnerability of the economy to a
sharp decline in demand when an
asset bubble bursts. So how should
monetary policy makers respond to a
development such as the equity price
bubble that emerged in the second
half of the 1990s? 
An asset bubble, simply defined, is a
large and unsustainable increase in
the prices of a subset of real or
financial assets above their
fundamental, long-term values.
Unfortunately, such bubbles are
inherently difficult, if not impossible, to
identify in real time.  Indeed, Alan
Greenspan, the Fed’s chairman, has
suggested that the best way to know
whether a particular increase in asset
prices is a bubble is to see whether
those prices subsequently fall by 40%
or more! So the first question is
whether we have the operational
means to detect bubbles in real time
with a confidence that would allow us
to take preemptive policy actions early
enough to make a difference.   
It would be useful to have a simple
rule indicating to monetary policy
makers how they should respond to
rising asset prices and potential asset
bubbles, even if how they applied
such a rule to economic developments
was within their discretion. But first
we need to identify the objectives of
monetary policy, its instruments and
the transmission mechanism to
aggregate demand.
In the US, the Congress has required
that the Fed set monetary policy to
achieve dual objectives: full
employment and price stability. Most
models of the monetary policy
process, therefore, begin explicitly or
implicitly with an objective function
according to which losses are
proportional to deviations of output
from its full employment level and
inflation from the Fed’s target. 
Virtually all central banks use a short-
term interest rate as their policy
instrument.  In the case of the US,
this is the federal funds rate. At each
of the Federal Reserve Open Market
Committee’s eight meetings a year,
the Fed sets a target for the federal
funds rate that applies until the next
meeting. The Manager of the System
Open Market Account is then
responsible for conducting open
market operations to maintain the
actual rate as close as possible to the
target rate.
by Laurence H. Meyer
Laurence H. Meyer looks back on his time
at the US Fed and asks whether its systems
for forecasting and moderating stock market
bubbles needs some modification.
Bubbling along
Spending decisions, however, are
not linked directly to the federal
funds rate. The power of monetary
policy comes from its influence on a
wider range of financial variables
that do directly impact on spending
decisions, including short- and
longer-term private interest rates,
equity and other asset prices, and
foreign exchange rates.  These
indices of broader financial
conditions are, of course, also
affected by developments other than
monetary policy, including changes
in the perception of risk, in inflation
expectations and in fiscal policy. 
A simple way to represent the
strategy of monetary policy is the
Taylor rule, named after the Stanford
economist who is currently
Undersecretary for International
Affairs at the US Treasury. This
formula sets out how monetary
policy makers adjust, or should
adjust, the federal funds rate in
response to developments in output
and inflation. It can be thought of as
a representation of how policy 
makers on average have conducted
policy in the past and/or of how
policymakers should conduct policy
in order to achieve their objectives.
It is best not to think of the Taylor
rule as a formula that policy 
makers are obliged to follow, but
rather as a simple representation 
of systematic guidelines that inform
the discretionary choices of 
policy makers.  
The Taylor rule begins with the
concept of an equilibrium real
federal funds rate. This is the real
federal funds rate (i.e. the nominal
rate less the expected inflation rate)
that is appropriate when output and
inflation are at levels consistent with
the policy maker’s objectives in
terms of full employment and price
stability. Given the equilibrium real
rate, the Taylor rule then prescribes
that monetary policymakers should
adjust the nominal funds rate so as
to move the real funds rate in
proportion to deviations of output
and inflation from their respective
objectives.
The logic of this adjustment reflects
two features of the underlying model
of the economy.  First, the consensus
model holds that increases in real
rates, via their impact on broader
financial conditions, lower aggregate
demand and hence production and
employment.  Second, it holds that
inflation depends on inflationary
expectations (and, perhaps, also past
inflation) and on the balance between
aggregate demand and supply in the
product and labour markets. This
balance is proxied by the percentage
gap between actual and potential
output, or the difference between the
unemployment rate consistent with
steady inflation (the non-accelerating
inflation rate of unemployment, or the
NAIRU) and the actual rate of
unemployment.
If output falls below its full
employment level or if the
unemployment rate rises above the
NAIRU, then a decline in the real
funds rate would stimulate aggregate
demand and hence raise production
back towards its potential level and
lower the unemployment rate back to
the NAIRU level. If inflation rises
above its objective, a rise the 
real funds rate would have the
opposite effects.
In terms of this framework, we can
now identify how policy makers
should respond to changes in asset
prices. The conventional wisdom is
that they should respond only
indirectly to changes in asset prices.
It says that they should respond only
to the extent and in proportion to the
effect of changes in asset prices on
output and inflation relative to
monetary policy objectives. In other
words, policy makers should continue
to follow the simple Taylor rule.
This framework already allows for the
indirect response to the extent that
the changes in asset prices affect
output and inflation. Specifically, if
wealth owners become more
optimistic about earnings growth and
bid up the price of equities, the
resulting wealth effects and the
decline in financing costs for firms
would increase consumer spending
and business investment, thereby
increasing overall aggregate demand
and raising output relative to potential.
Monetary policy would respond by
raising the real federal funds rate in
proportion to the effects on output
and inflation.
But should monetary policy makers
do more than what is called for in this
indirect response?  Specifically,
should they respond directly to
changes in asset prices? It is useful
here to make a distinction between
simply responding to changes in
asset prices and responding to the
possible emergence of an asset
bubble. In the typical models
underlying the indirect approach,
changes in asset prices, working
through to consumer spending and
business investment, have the same
effect whether they reflect
fundamentals or speculation. If the
policy concern is about the potential
damage associated with the
emergence and subsequent
correction of asset bubbles, we need
to go a step further and construct a
measure of asset bubbles.
This is a demanding task. One could
use a measure of fundamental value
for equity prices, for example one
based on a long average of the price-
earnings ratio.  Alternatively, one
could develop a more sophisticated
model of equity prices and use it as a
measure of the deviation of equity
prices from fundamental values.
An increase in asset prices based on
fundamentals is easier to handle
through the indirect approach. It is
just another factor affecting overall
aggregate demand and hence output
and inflation relative to objectives. A
speculative rise in asset prices, on the
other hand, is different. Here the
policy concern may be less the
inflationary consequences of the
surge in equity prices than the
deflationary consequences of the
ensuing correction.
The question is whether responding
to the inflationary potential of the
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Such bubbles are difficult to
identify in real time
speculative rise in equity prices is
enough to limit the emergence of a
bubble and the adverse effects of the
subsequent correction. The
divergence of asset prices from
fundamental values becomes an index
of an accident waiting to happen. In
these circumstances, the idea of a
direct monetary policy approach is at
least an interesting one. 
However, it leaves open the question
of whether responding on the basis
of imperfect measures of equity
bubbles would improve upon the
results under the indirect approach.
The case for the direct approach
depends on whether we can
demonstrate that responding directly
to asset prices improves the
performance of output and inflation
relative to their objectives.
This is a potentially fruitful topic for
research and I have an open mind
about it. But I begin with some
skepticism, based on two major
considerations.  The first is the
inherent difficulty of identifying asset
bubbles, especially in time to take
action to prevent them from becoming
dangerously large. The second is that
the Taylor rule appears so well
designed in relation to the objective
function, directing policy makers to
respond to precisely the deviations
that give rise to costs in terms of the
loss function.
Indeed, occasional asset bubbles may
be inevitable in a capitalist economy,
particularly a dynamic one that goes
through occasional waves of
innovation and technical change. My
views in this respect are shaped by
both the insights of my former
Washington University colleague, the
late Hyman Minksy, and by my
reading of the long historical
experience of the American economy.
Minsky always argued that economic
expansions naturally give rise to
conditions that encourage increased
risk-taking and higher valuations of
risky assets. His work focused on the
tendency toward excess during
expansions. Time and again, during
periods of prolonged favourable
macroeconomic experience,
individuals take on increased risk in
portfolios, bid up asset prices to
unsustainable levels and take on new
levels of debt. This process increases
the vulnerability of the economy to
adverse shocks and, thereby,
heightens the potential for such
shocks to cause a sharp correction of
asset prices, debt service problems
and bankruptcies that would
aggravate what otherwise might have
been a milder downturn.
The historical precedents for the
recent technology-related asset
bubble may shed additional light on
the circumstances that are especially
conducive to the formation of asset
bubbles. In a paper that I wrote in
1999,* I suggested that, in very broad
brush terms, more than 100 years of
US economic history could be viewed
as a series of relatively long
productivity cycles – periods of about
a quarter century of higher and then
lower productivity growth. Typically,
productivity growth has averaged
about 11/2% per year 
during low productivity periods and
about 3% during high productivity
periods. Although it is difficult to be
precise about those relationships, the
cycles in productivity appear to be
related to cycles in the pace of
innovation, with high productivity
periods coincident with or following a
bunching of innovations.
One of the regularities that has often
appeared in periods following an
acceleration in productivity is a surge
both in equity prices and in investment
in the innovating industries, followed
by a correction in both. Even when the
innovations were fundamentally
important and productivity enhancing,
the associated corrections highlight
the difficulty that businesses inevitably
encounter in successfully exploiting
them. In addition, the swings in asset
prices reflect the tendency to
overestimate the extent or persistence
of the profit opportunities that follow
from innovations.
It also seems that some expansions
are more likely than others to
encourage the development of asset
bubbles. In particular, expansions
driven by demand shocks seem less
likely to encourage asset bubbles
than expansions driven by supply
shocks, specifically expansions
accompanied by and driven by
accelerations in productivity.
During demand-driven expansion, real
interest rates tend to rise as above-
trend growth raises utilisation rates.
Rising real interest rates, in turn,
ensure that there will be
countervailing forces in play on equity
valuations. The cyclical improvement
in earnings will encourage a rise in
equity valuations, while the rise in
interest rates will tend to lower equity
valuations. 
By contrast, during expansions driven
to an important degree by supply
shocks, especially by accelerations in
productivity growth, rising resource
utilisation rates do not lead as quickly
to higher inflation, or a perceived
threat of higher inflation. In the
absence of an inflation threat, policy
makers may be more hesitant to raise
the real interest rate. As a result, a
cyclical expansion might proceed for
quite a while with no marked
tendency toward higher real interest
rates, or at least with substantially
smaller increases in real interest rates
than would occur during an expansion
driven by demand shocks. 
In the US expansion of the second
half of the 1990s, the earliest
concern about the possibility that
equities might be overvalued was
Alan Greenspan’s comment in
December 1996 about the possibility
of “irrational exuberance”. Looking
back, it is not at all obvious that
equities were overvalued at the time.
With benefit of hindsight we can see
that we were at the time in the early
stages of an acceleration in
productivity. Indeed, it seems clear
that the asset bubble in the US was
confined to technology sector. The
ratio of the NASDQ to the broader
Willshire index is a good proxy for the
emergence of the technology asset
CentrePiece Autumn 200220
* ÒWhat Happened to the New Economy?Ó, New York Association of Business
Economics and Downtown Economists, June 6 2001
Virtually all central banks 
use a short-term interest rate
as their policy weapon
bubble and its subsequent
correction. This ratio jumped sharply
in the second half of 1999 and into
early 2000, precisely at the point that
the equation errors suggest
significant overvaluation in overall
equity valuations. Technology stocks
then fell by 70% peak to trough,
more than meeting the Greenspan
40%+ definition of a bubble, while
non-technology stocks declined by
only 15%.
US nominal interest rates were nearly
stable from the end of 1995 to the
third quarter of 1998, with only a
single 1/4point tightening during this
period. Growth was consistently in
the 4 - 41/2% range and
unemployment had declined from
about 51/2% to 41/2%, a level that in
the past would have been consistent
with building inflationary pressures.
But, since core inflation was declining
throughout the period, the real federal
funds rate was rising.
Policy makers, though, were
becoming increasingly uncertain
about their estimate of the NAIRU, the
critical unemployment threshold below
which inflation pressures were
expected to build. This uncertainty
spawned two reactions inside the
Fed. One line was that policy makers
should attenuate their response to the
unemployment rate, because of the
uncertainty about the NAIRU. In this
case, the real federal funds rate
should not rise or not rise as
aggressively as it otherwise might in
response to the falling unemployment
rate, pending direct evidence of rising
inflationary pressure.
The second line was to continuously
update estimates of the NAIRU, using
all available information, including
information about inflation. Here the
lower-than-expected inflation was
interpreted as evidence of a decline in
the NAIRU. The estimate of the
NAIRU should then be updated
continuously and monetary policy
might then continue to be about as
aggressive as otherwise relative to
this continuously adjusted estimate of
the gap.  
In either interpretation, the real funds
rate does not increase as
aggressively as would have otherwise
been the case.  At the same time, the
productivity acceleration may have
resulted in an increase in the
equilibrium real federal funds rate.
The gap between the real federal
funds rate and its equilibrium value
widened when the Fed eased by 75
basis points from the end of
September to mid-November 1988
and remained wide until it began to
tighten policy in mid-1999.
The Fed eased policy in response to
a seizing up of the fixed-income
markets and in response to a global
financial crisis that was widely
expected to result in a sharp slowing
in the US economy. In the event, US
growth was virtually unaffected, as
domestic demand soared and offset
the drag from lower foreign demand
for US goods.  
In retrospect, it could be argued that
the failure to move in a more timely
fashion to reverse the decline in the
funds rate, once fixed-income markets
were again operating more smoothly
and once it became clear that the US
economy would defy the slowdown
elsewhere, might have fed the equity
bubble. But even this is not clear,
given that much of what now appears
to have been a significant over-
valuation in equities occurred during
the period when the Fed was 
raising interest rates from mid-1999 to
mid-2000.    
The point here is that the special
features of an expansion driven by a
productivity acceleration induce policy
makers to be more cautious about
raising the real interest rate in
response to rising utilisation rates
and, at least, provides a fertile
environment for the formation of 
asset bubbles.
It remains the strongly held view at
the Federal Reserve – shared by
many other central banks – that
monetary policy should not target
asset prices, nor respond directly to
movements in them.  To do so would
substitute policy makers’ judgment for
that of the market. To go beyond the
indirect approach to monetary policy
and make a frontal assault of the
wealth of American citizens, the Fed
would have to be awfully confident of
its assessment that an equity bubble
was emerging and of the seriousness
of the danger associated with it.
However, even within the spirit of an
indirect approach to monetary policy
there may be some adjustments that
could reduce the prospects for, or at
least limit the size of, equity bubbles.
Ensuring that real interest rates rise,
where justified, in an expansion driven
by a productivity acceleration would
maintain at least some friction
between rising earnings expectations
and rising real interest rates.  This
might do something to make it less
likely that an asset bubble would
emerge, or to reduce its size.
A more forward-looking monetary
policy, responding to forecasts of
output gaps and inflation and not just
reacting to actual movements in
these variables, would contribute to a
more timely indirect response,
particularly when are dramatic
increases in equity values. In
addition, the target set for the funds
rate should rise to keep pace with the
increase in the equilibrium real
interest rate that is expected to
accompany an acceleration of
productivity. Theoretical analysis
suggests, and empirical analysis
confirms, that the equilibrium real rate
will rise at least in line, percentage
point for percentage point, with the
structural productivity growth rate.
Such a rise would reintroduce the
friction between earnings optimism
and rising rates that limits open-
ended increases in equity prices
during demand-led expansions.  
Staff at the Federal Reserve Board
have been working on estimates of
the variation in the equilibrium real
rate of interest over time. This
confirms that it tends to move
percentage point for percentage point
in line with underlying productivity
growth. While this might seem to
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Should policy makers 
respond directly to changes 
in asset prices?
open up promising policy options,
retaining the standard indirect
approach but nevertheless allowing
monetary policy to lean against
otherwise open-ended increases in
equity values, such an approach has
difficulties in practice.
First, it takes time to appreciate that
there has been an increase in
underlying productivity growth. While
the data now suggests that higher
productivity growth began in 1996
and further increases occurred
through 1998, many – including
myself – were not convinced of this
until late 1998 or early 1999. Indeed,
the data were not definitive until the
revisions in the summer of 1999 and
again in the summer of 2000.
Second, we are still iterating the
revised productivity data to reach an
understanding of how large the
acceleration in productivity has been.
There continues to be a high degree
of uncertainty about what the
underlying rate of productivity 
growth was and will be. Finally, 
we can estimate the equilibrium 
real interest rate only with
considerable imprecision.  
Nevertheless, it seems to me that
work on varying equilibrium real rates
over time is an important.  If we build
more confidence in the estimates,
they might provide some basis for
movements in the real funds rate
consistent with the basic principles of
the Taylor rule. 
Analysis of the appropriate monetary
policy in the face of a bursting of an
asset bubble is quite a bit simpler. On
the surface, it appears that the
response here is basically the same
as it would be to other abrupt adverse
shocks to the economy.  But there are
some special considerations that have
to be taken into account.
First, the generally aggressive policy
response to the bursting of an asset
bubble will generally reflect the
likelihood that asset price movements
on the way down will be more
discontinuous and abrupt than on the
way up. This sometimes leads to the
claim that monetary policy responds
asymmetrically to increases and
decreases in asset prices. Policy
makers, it is said, are willing to
tolerate, even celebrate, an open-
ended rise in asset prices, but
respond quickly and aggressively to
limit any decline.
As Alan Greenspan has noted, it is
not policy that is asymmetric, but
markets. This asymmetry partly
reflects the different dynamic pattern
associated with up and down
movements. But it also reflects the
potential for sharp declines to be
accompanied by a dramatic decline in
liquidity in financial markets, resulting
in increased risks of broader financial
instability. Sometimes – in 1987, 1998
and again in the most recent
experience – policy eased quickly and
sharply to accommodate a dramatic
increase in the demand for liquidity
that accompanied a correction of
asset prices, or other financial market
turbulence.
Second, the bursting of an asset
bubble is often not a spontaneous
event, but one triggered by some
shock – for example, an unexpected
change in policy or an unexpected
slowdown in aggregate demand. In
the case of the technology bubble,
there was a combination of tighter
monetary policy, an adverse energy
shock, a resulting slowdown in the
pace of the expansion and an
apparent reassessment of the
profitability of owning and using high
tech equipment. The result of the
latter shock was both a decline in
equity valuations and a retrenchment
in high tech investment, above and
beyond the effect on equity
valuations. An easing of monetary
policy might have to be very
aggressive in this case because 
a significant easing would be
required just to offset the effect on
financial conditions of the decline in
equity prices.   
Clearly, monetary policy is a very
blunt instrument during a period of the
potential emergence of an asset
bubble. It will be difficult for it to slow
the economy in the face of a
continued rise in equity prices. There
is also the danger that the cumulative
monetary restraint implemented in
such circumstances may ultimately
slow the economy more than is
desired or expected. But we should at
least be alert to the conditions that
facilitate the emergence of asset
bubbles and continue to work on
approaches that could militate against
open-ended speculative increases in
equity prices.
CentrePiece Autumn 200222
Laurence H. Meyer is a Distinguished
Scholar at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies in Washington DC
and Senior Advisor to Macroeconomic
Advisers. He was a Governor of the US
Federal Reserve Board from June 1996 to
January 2002.
This article is an edited version of a public
lecture delivered at the LSE on May 23.
Occasional asset bubbles 
may be inevitable in a
capitalist economy
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n 1998, New Labour’s first full year of office, David
Blunkett as Education Secretary identified four
targets for his Department to hit before December
2002. These related to Standard Assessment Test
(SAT) scores at age 11, GCSE results at age 16 and
qualification attainment among young people and
adults. To underline the importance of these targets,
Mr Blunkett promised to resign if the SAT target was not
hit in time.
A Cabinet reshuffle last year ensured that Mr Blunkett’s
bluff would not be called. This appeared fortunate
because, when his successor took over, all four targets
were still standing and, looming up behind them, was the
Prime Minister’s own declared objective of seeing 50% of
young people in higher education by 2010. 
With the December 2002 deadline now upon us, the
GCSE target has been hit and the SAT target narrowly
missed. Although the results for qualification attainment
among young people and adults are not yet in, attainment
among adults has improved markedly. However, the same
by Damon Clark
Staying on
Will the government's target for participation in higher education by
2010 be met? Damon Clark analyses the reasons why young people
drop out of education and concludes that more emphasis on good
work-based learning will be required.
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Figure 3: The Importance of the Staying On Rate
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cannot be said of attainment among young people. Here,
little progress has been made. 
The difference between outcomes and the targets for young
people is illustrated in Figure 1. Although the target
comprises both the proportion of 19-year-olds with attain-
ment at NVQ Level 2 (notably five or more higher-grade
GCSE passes or one A Level) and the proportion of 21-
year-olds with attainment at NVQ Level 3 (two or more A
levels), the graph displays information only for the 19-year-
olds. (The picture for 21-year-olds is similar.) 
The bad news for the government is that, since 1998, the
proportion of 19-year-olds with attainment at Level 2 has
increased only slightly. As a result, the 2001 outcome lags
behind the 2002 target by almost ten percentage points.
The bad news for the Conservatives is that, as shown in
Figure 1, Tory governments missed targets almost as
spectacularly. The consistency with which attainment
among young people has undershot the targets set over the
years emphasises how big a challenge the government has
set itself. If these targets are to be met, and if higher educa-
tion is to expand as Mr Blair envisages (see Figure 1),
decade-long trends will need to be bucked. 
Why have the targets for young people not been hit? The
immediate reason can be traced to Figure 2. This charts
recent trends in the staying on rate, the proportion of
school leavers that continue into full-time further educa-
tion. Since the staying on rate is the engine powering
attainment and entry into higher education, it is not
surprising that the spluttering performance seen after
1993 has had such an adverse impact on these later
outcomes. Following the huge increase in staying on that
occurred in the late 1980s and early 1990s, this staying
on standstill seems especially strange. 
Why, though, is the staying on rate is so pivotal to attain-
ment among young people and entry into higher education.
Figure 3 classifies school leavers into three groups: those
that continue into further education, those engaged in work-
based training (e.g. Modern Apprenticeship) and the
remainder. School leavers in this last group may be
working, unemployed or out of the labour force. 
The connection between staying on and qualifications
attainment is straightforward. For those young people who
do not acquire Level 2 qualifications in school, these must
be attained either in work or in further education. The
connection between staying on and entry into higher educa-
tion entry is even more mechanical, since it is unusual for
young people to enter higher education without first staying
on into further education. Although some increases in
higher education entry can be bought by luring mature
students into higher education, the 2010 target is unlikely to
be met by this strategy alone. 
Note first that, since school leavers who want to stay on are
entitled to do so by law, the supply of further education
Figure 2: The Staying On Rate (%)
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The staying on rate is pivotal to attainment and entry into higher education
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places does not come into it. Although there may be a small
number denied their legal entitlement, stories of further
education institutions struggling to fill places abound. 
So we need to focus instead on the demand side, viewing
the “staying on” choice as an investment decision. This
implies that school leavers will stay on when the returns
reaped tomorrow (higher wages, a reduced risk of
unemployment) exceed the costs incurred today (the small
direct costs of books and materials, the large indirect costs
of foregone earnings). Economists have taken this
approach since the 1960s, when the Nobel Prize-winning
economist Gary Becker drew an analogy between this type
of “human capital” investment and the investments in
physical capital (such as factories and computers) made
by firms. 
The perceived returns to staying on will depend on the value
that school leavers expect their future employers to place
on education. They will also depend crucially on success in
school, as measured by GCSE achievement. School
leavers who do well in school will have more to gain from
staying on. 
The costs of staying on will be non-monetary as well as
monetary. Some school leavers may enjoy education
irrespective of the potential financial gains to doing so and
this is, probably, the main channel through which parental
social class influences the staying on decision. 
Family background may also affect the monetary costs of
staying on, since wealthy parents may subsidise their
children’s further education. But the most important
80
60
40
20
0
1970 1975 1985 1990 1995 20001980
Unemployment (range scaled)
Exam Achievement
Staying On Rate
Figure 4: Why has the staying on rate not Increased?
One force may be the collapse of youth unemployment
monetary cost will be foregone earnings, which depend
crucially on the state of the local labour market, as measured
by the rate of youth unemployment. Put simply, when school
leavers cannot find jobs, they have little to lose by staying on
in education. If, on the other hand, they have the option of
earning £8,000 a year (say) at work, then the effective cost
of two years of further education is £16,000.  With this in
mind, we can now consider whether trends in exam
achievement and youth unemployment can explain the
staying on standstill and, by extension, the difficulties
governments have encountered in meeting their targets for
young people.
A number of studies have investigated the impact of GCSE
attainment on the staying on rate. The basic approach is to
take a cross section of school leavers and examine whether
those with good GCSEs are more likely to stay on, control-
ling where possible for other factors such as family
background. Not surprisingly, a strong positive correlation is
always found between exam achievement and staying on.
For example, in the most recent study of this kind, the
predicted probability of staying on for boys was found to rise
from 0.084 for those with no exam achievements to 0.869
for those with greater than five higher-grade GCSE passes.
The equivalent rise for girls was from 0.172 to 0.884.
Figure 4 illustrates the correlation between exam achieve-
ment and staying on over the past 30 years. While the
positive nature of this correlation is evident, the remarkable
feature of the graph is that the staying on standstill occurred
despite steady increases in exam achievement. This
suggests that, over this period, there were other forces
dragging the staying on rate down.
One such force may be the collapse in youth unemployment
that occurred over the mid- to late 1990s. As Figure 4
shows, there appears to exist a tight correspondence
between unemployment and staying on over time. Certainly,
the increased unemployment induced by the recessions of
CentrePiece Autumn 200226
Table 1: Breakdown of staying on changes for boys
(percentage points)
1981-1988 1988-1993 1993-2001
Actual changes 3.41 22.86 -0.92
Changes predicted by model 3.96 22.21 -4.04
of which due to:
GCSE achievements 2.32 11.59 8.14
Youth unemployment -2.65 6.32 -9.25
Other 4.29 4.30 -2.93
Unexplained changes -0.54 0.66 3.12
the mid-1970s and early 1980s were accompanied by
sharp increases in staying on. This suggests that the
staying on standstill may be due to a fall in youth unemploy-
ment offsetting increases in exam achievement. This would
contrast with the 1988 to1993 period, when improved exam
achievement and increased unemployment combined to
dramatically increase the staying on rate.  
This seems like a neat explanation. It fits the basic facts; it
is intuitively plausible; and it is consistent with anecdotal
and survey evidence garnered from school leavers and
those working in further education. Yet it may not be the
correct explanation. It may be that the correlation between
unemployment and staying on is a spurious one, or that the
correlation is real, but not strong enough to support such a
simple story. 
I have analysed some regional-level data to test whether this
story could be supported. Suppose that over the period
1993 to 1996, youth unemployment in the North fell faster
than youth unemployment in the South. If the national-level
correlation between youth unemployment and staying on
was merely a coincidence, we would not expect to see the
difference in staying on rates between North and South
follow any particular pattern. If we believe the youth
unemployment story, however, then we would expect to see
participation fall faster (or increase less sharply) in the North
than in the South. 
Based on a well-established extension of this idea, my
analysis strongly supports the simple story told in Figure 4,
with the caveat that the picture is clearer for boys than for
girls. Taking these results, we can break down changes in
participation over time into those attributable to changing
exam achievement, those attributable to changing youth
unemployment and those attributable to other factors, such
as the difference in earnings between those who stay on
and those who leave.
The results are presented in Table 1, which focuses on
changes in boys’ staying on rates over three periods of
interest. Between 1981 and 1988, the staying on rate
increased by 3.4 percentage points. My results suggests
that, had nothing else changed, the reduction in youth
unemployment that occurred during this period would have
decreased participation by 2.6 percentage points.
However, other things did change: most notably the level of
exam achievement, which increased as Figure 4 shows. I
estimate this to have contributed 2.3 percentage points to
the overall rise, with the remainder explained by other
factors. 
My analysis suggests that the huge increase in staying on
seen during the period 1988 to 1993 was driven by
improved exam achievement, increased unemployment and
other factors. In contrast, when we consider the period
since 1993, during which the staying on rate has stood still,
we see that reductions in youth unemployment cancel out
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the effects of increased exam achievement, which is in line
with the story set out above. 
Let us now consider the policy implications of these
findings. A diagnosis centred on falling unemployment does
not point to any specific policy remedies. It does imply that
a recession would increase the staying on rate, but the cure
would then be worse than the disease. 
Instead, the discussion points in two more general direc-
tions. The first is obvious. The analysis confirms that staying
on is heavily dependent on GCSE achievement. Policies
that directly or indirectly improve GCSE attainment will
increase the staying on rate. Almost one child in three
leaves education at age 16, mostly with very few qualifica-
tions or none at all. Although the proportion leaving without
Level 2 qualifications has come down of late, it is still high
by international standards.
The second direction in which the analysis points is work-
based training. That some school leavers only stay on when
they cannot find jobs suggests that, for some, work may be
the more rewarding as well as the more lucrative option. In
principle, work-based routes to skills may be the optimal
solution for these types of school leaver, since they enable
them to earn a wage and provide them with a more appeal-
ing context in which to continue their education. 
In practice, the Modern Apprenticeship scheme compares
unfavourably with both traditional British apprenticeship and
with the type of apprenticeship training undertaken by two
thirds of German school leavers. School leavers who would
otherwise incline towards work-based training may, there-
fore, choose instead to take a job that does not offer any
training. As Hilary Steedman argued in a previous article
(“Are we being serious about apprenticeship?”
CentrePiece, Spring 2002), despite some early progress in
this field, the government has neither struck the right
balance between the interests of modern apprentices and
of firms that employ them, nor has it encouraged a transition
from work-based training to higher education. Such a
transition would make training more attractive and help to
meet the higher education target.
A third direction, to which our research does not speak
directly but along which the government is already
progressing, is to provide school leavers with financial
incentives to stay on. Under the Educational Maintenance
Allowance (EMA) scheme announced by the Chancellor in
July, the government will pay money to school leavers who
come from low-income households and who choose to
continue into further education.  
Whether money matters to the staying on decision is an
issue that researchers have been chipping away at for
years. Although the question posed is usually whether
school leavers with richer parents are more likely to stay on,
even this has yet to be answered satisfactorily. This gap in
our knowledge, mainly due to a lack of reliable income data,
makes the first analyses of the EMA pilots so interesting.
These suggest that, on average, staying on rates increased
by 5% in the pilot areas.  
This is large effect. Were it achieved at the national level, it
would be a welcome development that might have a signifi-
cant impact on qualifications attainment and on entry into
higher education. Yet to rely on this policy alone is to assume
that all school leavers have a price at which they can be
induced to stay on. While this may be true, for school leavers
already disillusioned with an education centred on the class-
room that price could be high.
Damon Clark is an affiliate of the CEP and of the Institute for the
Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn, Germany. From January 2003 he
will be a Visiting Fellow at the University of California at Berkeley.
This article is based on his paper, ÒParticipation in Post-
Compulsory Education in EnglandÓ, published as CEE Discussion
Paper No24 available from the CEP.
Staying on rates increased by 5% in pilot areas
The picture is clearer for boys than for girls
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To peg or 
In the summer the CEP organised a conference to look at the
experience of countries that have adopted the dollar or another
currency as their own. Ellen Meade speculates on how the
lessons from that conference might apply to the 
countries about to join the European Union.
S
ome countries in eastern Europe may
accede to the European Union in about
two years time. This would put them on
track to adopt  Europe’s single currency
from 2006. Unlike Great Britain, which
can still decide whether or not to join the
euro, these countries in eastern Europe
will not be able to opt out of monetary
union. The question facing them is when, not if.
Several well-known economists, including Willem Buiter of
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
and Jacek Rostowski of the Central European University,
have argued that countries in eastern Europe should adopt
the euro now, either unilaterally or by prior arrangement with
the EU. (This second option is often referred to as “consen-
sual euroisation”.)  In this case, the euro would circulate in
parallel to the domestic currency, or perhaps replace it
altogether.  In any event, this action would require authori-
ties to fix the value of the domestic currency in terms of the
euro, rather than participating in the so-called ERM2 target
band arrangement for two years before entering EMU.
The basic idea of “euroisation” is not particularly new.  It is
a form of official currency substitution in which the domes-
tic legal tender of a country is replaced by a reserve
currency. Economists generally regard official currency
substitution as the “hardest” form of pegged exchange rate
regime, one that is more difficult to reverse than a currency
board. Such official currency substitution has become
known as “dollarisation,” even if the currency chosen to
replace the domestic currency is the euro or some reserve
currency other than the US dollar.
Andorra, Monaco, San Marino and the Vatican City already
use the euro as their domestic currency (the euro replaced
the legacy currency that was already in use). In eastern
Europe, Kosovo and Montenegro also have euroised. A
number of other economies use an external currency for
their legal tender (see Table 1). From this table two striking
facts emerge: first, most of the economies “dollarised”
many decades ago; and, second, the population in these
economies is very small, ranging from 56 persons on
Pitcairn Island to 3.5 million in Puerto Rico. Before the
adoption of the dollar in Ecuador (population 12.9 million)
in 2000 and El Salvador (population 6.1 million) in 2001,
the average population in dollarising countries was
450,000. Countries that have dollarised have traditionally
been miniscule in economic terms, with strong trade ties to
the reserve currency country and relatively undeveloped
domestic financial markets. In fact, size may an important
determinant of success with respect to “dollarisation”. If
this is the case, the 1997 debate on dollarisation in
Argentina, the recent adoption of the dollar in Ecuador and
El Salvador and the calls for adoption of the euro in
countries in transition to EU membership can be seen as
fundamentally different in that these countries are all much
larger than the traditional “dollariser”.
A large academic and policy literature was written in the late
1990s, motivated by proposals that Argentina should
replace its then-successful currency board, which linked
the peso one-to-one with the US dollar, with a dollarisation
arrangement. A primary focus in this literature was on the
appropriate exchange rate arrangement when financial
liabilities are denominated in a reserve currency while finan-
cial assets are denominated in the domestic currency.
Large “liability dollarisation” makes a country vulnerable to
adverse balance sheet effects arising from changes in the
exchange rate.  Liability dollarisation can be seen as reduc-
ing the range of values for the exchange rate that domestic
authorities can tolerate.  Berg and Borensztein (2000)
provide a good summary of the pros and cons of dollarisa-
tion in the context of the Argentine debate.
Some, like Enrique Mendoza of the University of Maryland,
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by Ellen Meade
not to peg
see the fundamental advantage of dollarisation in terms of
“institutions substitution”, a process by which dollarising
countries “borrow” the monetary policy institutions of the
reserve currency country. In this view, dollarisation  is
superior to a currency board largely because, under dollar-
isation, the domestic central bank is “replaced” with the
central bank of the reserve currency issuer.
In the best circumstances, dollarisation eliminates currency
risk and, possibly, reduces default risk. The extent of these
gains depends, of course, on how irreversible dollarisation
is perceived to be. Ideally, gain in credibility from “institu-
tions substitution” will substantially narrow the spread on
dollar liabilities issued by the dollarising government,
relative to those issued by the US Treasury, producing
lower domestic interest rates.
Key to successful dollarisation, however, is that other
economic policies must be appropriate. In particular,
dollarisation is a commitment by the monetary authority
only and does not guarantee a responsible fiscal policy.
Ultimately, a lax fiscal policy will push up interest rates and
undermine the monetary regime. For example, credibility
gains from Argentina’s currency board were high in the
early years following its adoption in 1991, but eroded over
time as the government failed to consolidate its fiscal
policy.  In a recent monograph, Mussa (2002) provides an
interesting discussion of Argentina’s downfall.
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Other economic policies must be appropriate
Table 1 Economies Using Another Currency as Domestic Legal Tender
Country Population Political Status Currency used Since
Andorra 63,000 Independent Euro (French franc and 
Spanish peseta since 1278) 1999
Channel Islands 140,000 British dependencies pound sterling 1797
Cocos Islands 600 Australian external territory Australian dollar 1955
Cyprus, Northern 180,000 de facto independent Turkish lira 1974
Greenland 56,000 Danish self-governing region Danish krone Before 1800
Guam 150,000 U.S. territory U.S. dollar 1898
Kiribati 80,000 Independent Australian dollar 1943
Liechtenstein 31,000 Independent Swiss franc 1921
Marshall Islands 60,000 Independent U.S. dollar 1944
Micronesia 120,000 Independent U.S. dollar 1944
Monaco 30,000 Independent Euro (French franc since 1865) 1999
Nauru 8,000 Independent Australian dollar 1914
Niue 2,000 New Zealand 
self-governing Territory New Zealand dollar 1901
Norfolk Island 2,000 Australian external territory Australian dollar Before 1900
Northern Mariana Islands 48,000 U.S. commonwealth U.S. dollar 1944
Palau 18,000 Independent U.S. dollar 1944
Panama 2.5m Independent 1 balboa = US$ 1; uses dollar notes 1904
Pitcairn Island 56 British dependency New Zealand and US. dollars 1800s
Puerto Rico 3.5m U.S. commonwealth U.S. dollar 1899
Saint Helena 6,000 British colony pound sterling 1834
Samoa, American 60,000 U.S. territory U.S. dollar 1899
San Marino 24,000 Independent Euro (Italian lira since 1897) 1999
Tokelau 1,600 New Zealand territory New Zealand dollar 1926
Turks and Caicos Islands 14,000 British colony U.S. dollar 1973
Tuvalu 10,000 Independent Australian dollar 1892
Vatican City 1,000 Independent Euro (Italian lira since 1929) 1999
Virgin Islands, British 17,000 British dependency U.S. dollar 1973
Virgin Islands, U.S. 100,000 U.S. territory U.S. dollar 1917
Ecuador 12.9m Independent U.S. dollar 2000
El Salvador 6.1m Independent U.S. dollar 2001
Kosovo Euro
Montenegro Euro
Source: Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2002). 
Several econometric studies have shown that inflation
performance improves under a hard peg currency regime.
Ghosh, Gulde, and Wolf (2002) found that inflation is 10.5
percentage points per year lower under a hard peg than
under a floating exchange rate.  In their study, “hard peg”
regimes include currency boards as well as dollarisation.
Of the 10.5 percentage point reduction in inflation, 4.5
percentage points derive from lower money growth in the
pegged regime (the “discipline effect”), while the remain-
ing 5.5 percentage points represent the credibility gain
associated with the hard peg regime (the “confidence
effect”). As the methodology makes no distinction between
pegs maintained for a series of years and a series of pegs
sustained for a single year, the study was not able to say
anything about whether the discipline or confidence effects
associated with the peg diminish over time.
The literature on dollarisation generally does not distin-
guish between cases where it is pursued in isolation, or is
part of a broader integration agenda with the country that
issues the reserve currency.  In practice, there is more than
one way to dollarise or euroise.  During the 1997 debate in
Argentina, the central bank president Pedro Pou saw
dollarisation not as a single policy choice, but as a range of
policy options from unilateral to full monetary union. With
unilateral dollarisation or euroisation, the country adopting
the reserve currency asks nothing of the issuer, whereas
broader forms of dollarisation or euroisation involve some
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Table 2 Argentina's Quasi-Monies in Circulation
(Millions of Argentine pesos)
Denomination December March 
2001 2002
Federal government Lecop 1,039 2,649
Provincial “own” securities 1,627 2,591
1. Buenos Aires Patacones 822 1,591
2. Buenos Aires, City Porteno – –
3. Catamarca Ley 4748 26 31
4. Chaco Quebracho 50 100
5. Cordoba Lecor 200 300
6. Corrientes Cecaror 193 185
7. Entre Rios Bonfe 54 148
8. Formosa Bocanfor 33 50
9. Jujuy Patacon – 6
10. Mendoza Petrom – –
11. La Rioja Debt Cancelation 8 8
12. Tucuman Bocade 98 173
Quasi-monies:
Total 2,666 5,240
As percent of pesos in circulation 23.2 45.6
Source: De la Torre, Levy Yeyati, and Schmukler (2002),
set of on-going obligations for the issuer of the reserve
currency and thus require mutual agreement by the two
countries to a treaty or bilateral arrangement.
Argentina’s flirtation with dollarisation in 1997 was in the
context of a monetary treaty with the United States that
would have provided for some sharing of seignorage
revenue to fund a lender-of-last-resort facility.  In the
extreme, a monetary union such as the euro area could be
seen as the most cooperative form of arrangement, in which
participating countries share a currency and decision-
making power.
Dollarisation and euroisation raise important issues about
the degree of responsibility or commitment of the issuer to
the country adopting the issuer’s currency. When the policy
is not unilateral, the issuer has some stake in its success
(although the degree of this stake depends on the exact
requirements of the arrangement). The commitment of the
issuer can also serve to “bind in” the dollarising or eurois-
ing country, particularly if this commitment involves several
steps that will lead ultimately to further integration between
the two countries. Thus, dollarisation in Ecuador, which was
a unilateral undertaking in response to an economic and
financial crisis, differs from dollarisation in El Salvador,
which was part of a broader trade and integration strategy
with the United States. And euroisation in Andorra,
Monaco, San Marino and the Vatican City differs funda-
mentally from potential euroisation in EU accession
countries, because the latter countries seek eventually to
join monetary union and participate fully in the monetary
policy decision making of the European Central Bank.
In the Argentine case, US authorities opposed a monetary
treaty for fear that it would ultimately impose broader
responsibilities, or at least generate a perception that the
US was playing a role in the supervision of Argentine banks,
acting as lender of last resort and taking the Argentine
economy into account when setting US interest rates.
Argentina’s proposed monetary treaty, in fact, provided only
Size may be an important
determinant of the
success of dollarisation
for the US to share in seignorage revenue and did not
involve broader obligations.  Despite that, the view of US
authorities was that any treaty, no matter how narrow in
scope, was a political symbol that could serve to create
obligations for the currency issuer in times of crisis.  In the
debate over euroisation in accession countries, the opposi-
tion of European policy officials to this initiative could be
seen as reflecting fears that European authorities would be
held accountable in the event of a crisis, even for the results
of unlilateral decisions.
If dollarisation is to provide major credibility gains, it must
be widely viewed as irreversible and as an irrevocable
commitment to replace the domestic legal tender with the
reserve currency. However, the reversal of dollarisation is
not particularly difficult to implement. For example, Liberia
de-dollarised in 1998 after 54 years of using the US dollar
in parallel with its domestic currency. And, in Argentina, the
number of parallel currencies in circulation increased
dramatically as the crisis deepened and the currency board
linking the peso to the US dollar was abandoned (see Table
2).  Thus, linking the currency decision to a broader integra-
tion strategy can make dollarisation seem more irreversible
and enhance its credibility.
Many commentators have advocated early euroisation in
accession countries as an interim exchange rate arrange-
ment during the transition to EMU.  A target band system,
they argue, is crisis-prone and euroisation would be the
best regime to forestall a speculative attack on their curren-
cies. European officials do not see the so-called ERM2
machinery as crisis-prone, because of the wide bands
around the central rate. At this point, financial markets are
betting that the candidate countries will join the EU, so the
credibility gains associated with a move to euroisation
would be limited. However, euroisation might be helpful in
limiting financial market speculation in the event of a long
and unexpected delay in the accession process.
According to the Maastricht Treaty, the Council of Ministers
must approve the rate at which a currency joins the euro.
That requirement would appear to rule out unilateral euroi-
sation, in which an accession country would select its own
conversion rate.  However, as has been pointed out, there
are two Treaty-consistent options: (1) joint selection by the
Council and the accession country of the rate at which the
domestic legal tender is converted into euros (the “consen-
sual” option); or (2) a currency board arrangement in which
the euro is legalised as a parallel currency for use alongside
the domestic currency of the accession country.  Either
way, such use of the euro in the run-up to accession would
appear to make some sense as a transition measure to
discourage speculation, so long as it is implemented in the
context of sound macroeconomic policies and is not in clear
violation of the Maastricht Treaty.
Interestingly, a discussion similar to option (1) above arises
in the context of a UK referendum on the euro. Richard
CentrePiece Autumn 200232
References
Berg, A. and E. Borensztein (2000), ÒThe Pros and Cons of Full
Dollarization,Ó IMF working paper no. 00/50, March.
Bratkowski, A. and J. Rostowski (2002), ÒWhy Unilateral
Euroization Makes Sense for (some) Applicant Countries,Ó
Conference Paper, LSE.
Buiter, W. and C. Grafe (2002), ÒAnchor, Float or Abandon Ship:
Exchange Rate Regimes for the Accession Countries,Ó
Conference Paper, EBRD.
De la Torre, A., E. Levy Yeyati, and S. Schmukler (2002),
ÒArgentinaÕs Financial Crisis: Floating Money, Sinking Banking,Ó
Working Paper, June.
Ghosh, A., A. Gulde, and H. Wolf (2002), ÒExchange Rate
Regimes: Classification and Consequences,Ó Conference Paper,
LSE.
Levy Yeyati, E. and F. Sturzenegger (2002), ÒDollarization: A
Primer,Ó in E. Levy-Yeyati and F. Sturzenegger (ed.), Dollarization,
MIT Press, forthcoming.
Mendoza, E. (2002), ÒWhy Should Emerging Economies Give Up
National Currencies: A Case for ÔInstitutions Substitution,ÕÓ
Working Paper No. 8950, National Bureau of Economic
Research.
Mussa, M. (2002), ÒArgentina and the Fund: From Triumph to
Tragedy,Ó Working Paper, Institute for International Economics,
August.
* This article brings together perspectives from the recent conference
"Dollarisation and Euroisation: Viable Policy Options?" hosted by the LSE on
May 24-25, 2002.  The conference programme and papers are available on:
http://cep.lse.ac.uk/events/conferences/dollarization. A fuller account of the
conference by Ellen Meade, Nikolas Müller-Platenberg and Massimiliano Pisani
will be published in November by the CEP as an Occasional paper No.17.
Layard of the CEP and others claim that a referendum will
need to specify the rate of the pound’s conversion into the
euro.  This would appear to require that the British govern-
ment pre-negotiate the pound’s conversion rate with the
Council of Ministers.  
It must be viewed
as irreversible
Pathway
from Poverty?
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
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economic studies done on intellectual property laws.
It concludes that there are some benefits from
intellectual property protection; but that strengthening
such protection may not always boost economic
welfare and might even reduce it, even in developed
countries.
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